Plan for measures to undermine, destabilize and isolate Robert Havemann

Signature: BArch , MfS , HA XX /9, No. 1878, sheets 1-8

The Stasi attempted to silence SED critic Robert Havemann through subversive measures.

The plan demonstrates the lengths to which the secret police went.

The staunch communist Robert Havemann went from being an unofficial Stasi informant to an enemy of the state in just a few years.

In the 1950s, he supplied information to the Ministry for State Security (MfS). At the same time, however, he also criticized the political situation. The Stasi became increasingly suspicious of him, tapped his phone, and developed "action plans" against him.

Parallel to the growing popularity of his critical lectures at Humboldt University, the hardliners of the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) also mobilized against him.

Havemann was dismissed from his university position and from the SED.

The Stasi (Ministry for State Security) ensured that Havemann never again had the opportunity to speak out.

The surviving plan demonstrates the extent of the secret police's efforts. Some passages of the document are missing; they may have been destroyed by the Ministry for State Security.

The State Security Service (Stasi) employed subversion tactics as part of a range of measures in so-called operational procedures, which targeted individuals or entire groups.

Such measures were first codified in Directive 1/76.

The goal of this "subversion" was to destroy self-confidence.

The Stasi aimed to create a feeling of insecurity, provoke disappointment and dissatisfaction, or achieve public stigmatization.

Main Department XX
Berlin, January 31, 1978

Confirmed: Center

Major General plan to further restrict and prevent hostile activities by Havemann through [underlined: measures of subversion,] insecurity and isolation

Havemann, Robert, who was the subject of the operational procedure "Leitz", Reg. No .: 150/64, has not ceased and abandoned his hostile aims, intentions and activities despite comprehensive control and surveillance measures being initiated.

He tries through
- deliberate deception and misleading of the deployed security forces
- Application of new means and methods in the clandestine operation of organizing and conducting meetings with people from the operational area
- the maintenance of existing bases and contact persons in the GDR and the search for new ones, as well as
- the utilization of all available publication opportunities in mass media, newspapers and magazines of capitalist countries abroad,
    - especially the Federal Republic of Germany, West Berlin, France and Italy

to make its hostile attitude towards the GDR and against actually existing socialism as effective as possible for the masses.

In isolated cases, he has managed to circumvent his extensive isolation and the restrictions imposed by the Attorney General's Office.

"to refrain from maintaining or establishing contacts with foreign agencies and mass media hostile to the GDR"

to break through and reach the Western public through interviews or articles.

This is characterized above all by...
- the article "Dictatorship or Democracy", submitted by a member of the Central Committee of the IKP , [anonymized], published in the Italian party newspaper "Studio storici" 1/77
- An article on the nuclear debate in the Federal Republic of Germany , published as a letter to [anonymized], FRG , in the " Frankfurter Rundschau".
- the interview by [anonymized] (Paris) with Havemann, published in the Parisian "Le Monde" on 21.01.1978.

In addition, there were clandestinely organized meetings with contacts from West Berlin in his city apartment, in restaurants, theaters , or in the homes of his close circle of acquaintances ([anonymized] or [anonymized] until their relocation to West Germany).

Materials and information, including Western printed materials, were exchanged through these individuals.

Havemann maintains active connections
- to the operational area

[anonymized]
[anonymized]
[anonymized]
personal assistant of [anonymized]

[anonymized]
Lecturer at the Free University of West Berlin

[Handwritten addition: [anonymized]]

Havemann met these people either in the capital of the GDR or was in contact with them via [anonymized].

- in the GDR

his relatives ([anonymized])

[anonymized] (friend of wife)

[anonymized] and his family (pastor in Grünheide)

[Anonymized], attending physician (Buch Hospital)

[anonymized] (former lawyer)

Havemann meets with these individuals at varying intervals. They can also visit him at his property in Grünheide, except when anonymized.

The following sets of measures must be implemented:

I. Measures of subversion, isolation and insecurity, as well as the establishment and differentiated application of state sanctions.

1. Due to Havemann's ongoing activities to circumvent the restrictions imposed on him by using constantly changing means and methods, such as exploiting public facilities or private residences for unauthorized gatherings, the following measures are taken:

1.1. In cooperation with Department IX , Department VIII and the legal department of the MfS, to develop new proposals resulting in Havemann
- receiving a further and more extensive order
  - from the [underlined: public prosecutor's office],
    - which further restricts his [underlined: freedom of movement].

1.2. The state measures must be applied in a differentiated manner so that Havemann is

- compelled to comply with the sanctions imposed against him.

Specifically, this must be done by requiring Havemann
- [Strikethrough: -] he is prohibited from entering apartments,
  - properties or
  - public facilities
    - if he intends to use them for meetings with Western contacts;
- [Strikethrough: -] participation in events is not permitted if
  - there is suspicion or danger that he intends or is able to use them for provocations:
- [Strikethrough: -] On journeys outside his permanent residence of Grünheide or its immediate vicinity,
  - he will be questioned by the security forces of HA VIII
    - about his destination and reason for travel, and
  - reminded of his obligation to comply with the conditions of his stay.
- In case of apparent violations or contraventions, he will be returned to his property.

1.3. If Havemann adheres to the agreed-upon stipulations in a disciplined manner over a longer period,
- a decision may be made to temporarily interrupt or suspend the ongoing monitoring and observation measures in order
- to enable the implementation of other political-operational measures.
  - which could simultaneously lead to Havemann incriminating other people.

For example, by
- organizing an interview with [anonymized] in Grünheide
  - in order to prove that he misused church-owned premises and facilities,
    - which could then lead to further action.

5. The medical decision to revoke Havemann's driver's license
- can be specifically supported by a doctor informant
  - who maintains contact with him.
- Furthermore, following the previous approach,
  - credible rumors about his deteriorating health
    - can be deliberately spread both within and outside the GDR .

- These rumors would claim that he
  - is no longer capable of scientific work and
  - is instead resorting to repeating old, outdated theories, etc.

6. By utilizing existing informants or creating and introducing new ones to Havemann's wife,
- conditions must be created to
  - systematically separate her from Havemann
    - through extramarital affairs and
    - to further burden him psychologically and deter him from hostile activities.

Circumstances such as
- Havemann's excessive jealousy,
- his constant distrust of his wife,
- occasional marital disputes,
- Havemann's wife's need for acquaintances with other people, etc.,
- are to be deliberately exploited.

7. On Havemann's property in Grünheide, there is a wooden house, which belongs to [anonymized] and is used by Robert Havemann on the basis of a mutual lease agreement.

Until his relocation to West Germany, [anonymized] lived there with his family.

Furthermore, in the past, Havemann repeatedly made it available to hostile individuals for overnight stays and accommodation.

The property was made available for holding purposes.

The willingness of [anonymized] to lease or make this house available to the Stasi in the future (for which she has already handed over the existing documents) should be used to...
- to select a suitable IM who is vetted, reliable, and authorized to move into this house alone or with family
- to clarify the legal situation that allows access to the wooden house via Havemann's property.

The fundamental task of the IM should or can consist, depending on the political-operational situation, of

- to establish a good personal relationship with Havemann
  - with the aim of learning about
    - his further plans and intentions or
    - employing him, regardless of whether Havemann suspects that he is a source of the MfS.
- To ignore Havemann as the owner of the property and "not to know him"
- Depending on the situation and necessity,
- to engage in
  - political or personal disputes and arguments with Havemann.
  - to implement these and other possibilities in combination within the overall framework of the decomposition measures.

The legal department of the Ministry for State Security (MfS) must be involved in clarifying the legal aspects.

Implementing this measure would simultaneously further unsettle Havemann and deprive him of the possibility of accommodating other guests, including relatives, on his property for short or long periods.

https://www.stasi-mediathek.de/medien/plan-zu-massnahmen-der-zersetzung-verunsicherung-und-isolierung-von-robert-havemann/blatt/1/